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Commentary 
Crises, the spatial distribution of economic activity, and the geography of banking
Introduction
The geography of the financial crisis has become a growing area of research (Aalbers, 2009; 
Cameron, 2008; Sidaway, 2008). Wainwright and Rodgers (2013) argue that the financial crisis 
“could be better viewed as a series of uneven and interrelated crises” (page 1008), including 
the sovereign debt crisis, on which they elaborate by focusing on the need to examine tax 
systems and their implications across a variety of economic spaces. Theirs is a timely call 
that should be supported by all social scientists in a collaborative and interdisciplinary effort. 
It is indeed likely that the spatial perspective of geographers offers new insights, especially 
in a day and age when the importance of regional development has become recognised not 
only by scholars, but is frequently flagged up by government decision makers. However, 
economic models have not been primarily concerned with the question of spatial distribution 
of economic activity, since they often implicitly assume that markets ensure a geographically 
well-distributed economy. However, there are reasons to believe that this is not the case. One 
reason was identified by Wainwright and Rodgers: the tax system. Meanwhile, economic 
geographers and social scientists have previously undertaken research on the ‘varieties of 
capitalism’ (VoC). The VoC literature (Albert, 1993; Hall and Soskice, 2001; Hall and Thelen, 
2009; Hodgson, 1996; see also Boschma and Frenken, 2006; and Yeung, 2007) studies how 
key features of capitalist economies can differ, based on different institutional legacies. The 
approach has limitations, including that it tends to deemphasise causal explanations (Peck 
and Zhang, 2013). Despite, or because of this literature, only limited attention has been 
placed on the role of differing types and structures of banking systems. All too often it is 
assumed that banking infrastructure is homogeneous under globalisation. Yet, for instance, 
the structure of the Spanish banking sector differs from that in Germany, while both are 
significantly different from the UK banking sector. The recent crisis has highlighted the need 
to understand the diversity and causal role of banking systems, if policy interventions are to 
be designed successfully: it will be argued below that certain types of banking structures are 
more compatible with stable and sustainable economic growth, while others are more prone 
to the ‘recurring banking crises’ (Werner, 2005). Indeed, it is likely that the particular features 
of a country’s banking structure constitute an important causal factor in the stability of the 
banking system and the economy. The same features are also likely to have important spatial 
implications, as discussed below. Such insights would be useful to inform banking policy 
decisions.
While some research has identified a difference between ‘bank-based’ and ‘market-
based’ financial systems (Zysman, 1983), the fact is that all systems have banks (or a 
bank, as was usually the case in communist economies), but the structure of their banking 
systems may differ substantially, which has a number of consequences, including spatially. 
This has remained an underresearched area, and so has its link to other major issues such 
as the incidence of banking crises and the stability of financial systems, the stability and 
sustainability of economic growth, and the equity of economic outcomes. But understanding 
these issues is likely to be important for the conscious design of banking systems that deliver 
stable and sustainable growth without crises.
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Why do banks matter?
The first consideration is the question of just why banks matter. Until the financial crisis 
of 2008, the dominant position among economists has been not to worry about banks. 
Leading macroeconomic theories and models of the past two hundred years simply do not 
include banks. This is true for the classical and Keynesian approaches, eclectic so-called 
IS-LM models, monetarism, and even more so for the more recent and presently dominant 
approaches: namely, real business cycle theories and their variants. The main reason why the 
banking sector and its role have been ignored by economists is likely that banks have been 
considered mere ‘financial intermediaries’, playing the role of agents—collecting deposits 
and then lending these out again. As such, they could not have a markedly different effect 
on the economy from other intermediaries, such as insurance companies or stock brokers. 
However, there has been much empirical evidence that banks are indeed unique and different 
from other financial service providers, because their activity cannot be substituted by other 
nonbank financial intermediaries. Ashcraft (2005), for instance, showed that the closure of 
small, local banks in the US has a significant negative impact on local economic activity. So 
why are banks unique?
There are many proposals to answer this question. To name the most influential ones: 
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) argue that the “Illiquidity of assets provides the rationale both 
for the existence of banks and for their vulnerability to runs” (page 403). Diamond (1984) 
argues that banks mainly serve as monitors of borrowers. Rajan (1996), Diamond and Rajan 
(2001), and Kashyap et al (2002) argue that banks combine deposit-taking and lending 
activities, because for both activities liquidity provision is required. Combining them, for 
instance, allows banks to take advantage of economies of scale. Many of these theories are 
combined with the argument that banks ‘transform’ liabilities with particular features (short-
term, liquid, many small amounts) into assets with other features [longer term, illiquid, fewer 
larger amounts (see, for instance, Bernanke, 1993)]. However, these arguments apply equally 
to other types of nonbank financial institutions and, indeed, the theories often do not clearly 
separate banks from nonbank financial intermediaries. Thus they are not able to advance a 
consistent argument why banks are different from other financial intermediaries [such as 
insurance companies, which also gather funds and issue loans; for a more detailed critique of 
some of these theories, see Werner (2005; 2013)].
Schumpeter (1912), on the other hand, argued that the role of banks is causally connected 
to economic growth and development, through their ability to create credit. To reflect on this 
connection, consider the question of the origin of the money supply. 
Where does money come from?
It is an assumption in some influential economic models that the amount of funds available in 
an economy is limited. However, an economy characterised by a fixed total nominal amount 
of funds could not experience any nominal economic growth: growth means that more 
transactions take place during the observation period (say one year) than in the reference 
period (usually the previous year). It is impossible for transactions values to grow, without 
the amount of money used for transactions also growing. Thus for economic growth it is 
a necessary and sufficient condition that the amount of money used for transactions that 
contribute to GDP increases. This raises the important question of just how this money can 
increase. 
Where, indeed, does money come from? And where does it go? These questions, with 
obvious spatial implications, have rarely been asked by researchers. In a modern economy, 
central bank supply of notes and coins amounts to only about 3% of transactions—those 
petty transactions paid for in cash. The rest is settled through the banking system. As I have 
argued (Werner, 1997; 2005; 2012), banks thus are not primarily financial intermediaries and 
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accountants of record, but they are the creators of the money supply. In the UK about 97% 
of the money supply is newly created by the banking system, namely when loan applicants 
receive their funds as fictitious deposit entries—invented by the banks which are allowed 
to engage in such highly creative accounting. This is the process of credit creation (see also 
Ryan-Collins et al, 2012), providing evidence for a geographer’s critique of ‘fictitious capital’ 
(Roberts, 1994). Most economists did not spot this pivotal role of banks, since the most 
influential economic models and theories simply do not include banks [eg, Woodford (2003), 
or any of the so-called DSGE (dynamic stochastic general equilibrium) models, widely used 
by central banks].(1) 
Good credit, bad credit—and crises
There are a number of implications. First considering the general, nonspatial aspects: if bank 
credit is extended for productive investments that expand the amount or value of goods and 
services, sustainable and inflation-free growth can be generated. The bank credit expands 
the money supply, but this is matched by an increase in the value of goods and services, 
avoiding inflationary pressure, while the loans can be serviced and repaid from the income 
generated. If bank credit is extended for unproductive transactions, it is unsustainable and 
produces inflation, of two kinds. Firstly, credit for consumption results in consumer price 
inflation, since the amount of money supplied is increased, and hence the demand for goods 
and services, but there is no concomitant increase in the amount of goods and services. 
Secondly, if banks create credit for transactions that do not contribute to GDP—namely 
asset and financial transactions—this will tend to push up asset prices and commence an 
unsustainable Ponzi scheme that does not generate income, but merely capital gains. For 
asset price rises and hence capital gains to continue, however, ever-more bank credit creation 
for asset transactions is required. As soon as the music (credit creation for asset transactions) 
stops, asset prices will fall, and it will be found there are not enough chairs (speculators, 
requiring but not obtaining further asset price rises, will go bankrupt). Failing borrowers cause 
bad debts in the banking system, which render banks risk averse, so that they reduce credit 
creation further, including for GDP transactions. This results in further bad debts, but also 
in falling GDP growth, unemployment, and declining tax revenues—and a potential fiscal 
problem, especially when governments engage in the highly costly exercise of bailing out 
the quickly bankrupted banks (a fall in the value of banks’ assets by only 10% depletes more 
than the capital and hence implies banca rotta—the word’s etymology did not come about 
by chance). For a recovery, bank credit creation for GDP transactions (the ‘real economy’) 
needs to be stimulated [policies to achieve this were originally described with the expression 
‘quantitative easing’ (see Werner, 1995)].(2)
(1) For a critique of the methodology of mainstream approaches, see Werner (2005) and for DSGE 
models in particular, see de Grauwe (2010).
(2) This disaggregation of credit flows by quantity and quality was proposed in the Quantity Theory 
of Credit (Werner, 1997) and applied to the UK in Lyonnet and Werner (2012). Policies to stimulate 
a recovery via expanded credit for GDP transactions are discussed in Werner (2012), which has been 
echoed by the Bank of England in its Funding for Lending Scheme (FLS), announced in June 2012. 
FLS was designed to “incentivise banks ... to boost their lending to ... the ‘real economy’” (Bank of 
England Quarterly Bulletin 2012, Q4). The definition for ‘lending to the real economy’ employed 
by the Bank of England for FLS was almost identical to the empirical definition of credit for the real 
circulation as defined by the Quantity Theory of Credit and applied to the UK in Lyonnet and Werner 
(2012), which had been submitted to the Bank of England in July 2011. A further spatial disaggregation 
of credit has been attempted for Japan, but still needs to be implemented in the UK.
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Bank credit reshapes the economic landscape
We see that the banks’ decision of how much money to create and who to give it to 
determines the economic destiny of the country and, indeed, quickly and literally reshapes 
the economic landscape, across a variety of spaces. Whether banks decide to fund mainly 
large-scale speculative ventures—such as by providing leverage to hedge and private equity 
funds based in London and the City’s offshore dependencies, or to fund many small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) engaged in energy efficiency or carbon reduction projects 
employing many low-skilled or semiskilled staff in the remoter parts of the country will 
not only determine whether there will be stable and sustainable noninflationary growth or 
instead a credit-driven boom–bust cycle that causes banking crises. These decisions about 
the extension of bank credit will also have diverging effects on the geographical distribution 
of economic activity, income, taxation, location of habitation, transport and traffic patterns, 
and so forth. Yet, surprisingly little research has been conducted by social scientists of 
any persuasion, including economists, on this issue. Of the almost 4000 research articles 
produced and made available online by the major central banks in the twenty years to 2008 
(US Federal Reserve Board, New York Fed, Bank of England, European Central Bank, and 
Bank of Japan), virtually none covered topics such as banks’ ability and role in creating 
credit and the disaggregation of credit in different types and to different regions (Cheng and 
Werner, 2013).
International aspects of banking
The financial crisis of 2008 is often dubbed as having been ‘global’. In fact, it was located 
mainly in Europe and the US. Nevertheless, the investments by European banks in the US 
financial markets (especially in the form of structured credit derivatives of securitised high-
risk mortgage investments, or funds and special purpose vehicles that invested in these—all 
of which were in the end valued as largely worthless) had a significant negative impact on 
their financial stability, effectively bankrupting a number of major European banks. Thus it 
is clear that banking often has international consequences. This is particularly true for the 
major banks operating out of the square mile of sovereign territory known as the City of 
London Corporation. Many of them are not UK banks, but may hail from other countries. 
Furthermore, the volume of international transactions vastly exceeds domestic banking 
transactions, since it includes the foreign exchange deals that amount to more than $5 trillion 
daily. Much of the activity of banks based in the City or its offshore dependencies may not be 
regulated by domestic regulators, as it is classified as ‘offshore’: HSBC USA is considered 
part of the US banking system and is subject to regulation there. JP Morgan London is a 
major player in the UK banking system and its onshore business is supervised by the Bank of 
England. While it is a convention in international banking that accounts in any currency can 
ultimately be traced to banks that are regulated by the central bank that is associated with the 
respective currency of the territory, since the 1950s, the Bank of England has allowed largely 
unregulated ‘offshore’ finance out of London in any currency. Cross-border transactions 
expanded also in the eurozone—further fuelling the credit-driven asset bubbles that had been 
produced under the watch of the European Central Bank by banks in Ireland, Portugal, Spain, 
and Greece that had been creating credit at rapid pace mainly for asset speculation. However, 
international banking and its institutional details and consequences, surprisingly, also remain 
underresearched.
Large-scale banking versus local banking
To be sure, there is a recent and growing body of research on SME lending. Berger and 
Udell (2002) provide reasons why small banks are more likely to lend to small firms. 
Empirically, Zarutskie (2013) found in a study on US lending that bank size and bank age 
are significant factors determining bank lending, including to SMEs. Hakenes et al (2009) 
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also investigate the impact of regional banking on local economic growth, using German 
data, and find a positive correlation, especially in the less-developed regions. Knyazeva and 
Knyazeva (2012) analyse the role of geographic distance between banks and borrowers for 
bank lending decisions in the US. They conclude that a longer distance between banks and 
borrowers results in significantly higher spreads charged on loans. However, none of these 
studies explicitly treats banks as creators of the money supply; they often focus on interest 
rate effects, they do not go far enough in identifying diverse credit extension patterns or their 
causes and consequences, and they fail to emphasise the many spatial implications.
The monetary system we possess—of money creation not restricted to a geographically 
centralised government agency or central bank, but a delegated system of private sector money 
creators that are potentially situated in spatially diverse locations, distributed unevenly across 
the country—creates opportunities and risks, and may explain many of the phenomena social 
geographers have noted. 
Economies of scale dictate a number of features that have spatial implications: the fewer 
banks there are in a country, the larger each one tends to be. The larger banks are, the more 
they tend to favour large-scale projects (Berger et al, 2005), which tend to be geographically 
situated in clusters and centres (such as hedge funds and private equity funds, based mainly 
in Mayfair). 
A comparison between Germany and the UK, two countries with diverging spatial 
distribution structures of economic activity, serves to illustrate the point: In the UK the five 
major high street banks account for over 90% of bank deposits. Small, regional banks with 
local headquarters account for less than 5% of bank deposits. The large banks maintain a 
network of branches, but this is biased towards collecting deposits, while far fewer loans are 
granted to the many SMEs in the regions. Thus banks effectively serve to extract savings from 
the regions and inject new money in the centre—a form of bank-organised domestic capital 
flight. It is obvious why large banks are not interested in small borrowers in the provinces. 
If Lloyds Bank wishes to grow by 5%, it must increase its £1000 billion asset book by 
£50 billion. It can do so by cutting cheques of £1 billion each to fifty major hedge and private 
equity funds, which use the money to leverage their financial speculation. Alternatively, it 
can try to respond to the demand for small loans of, say, £20 000 each by SMEs all over 
the country, but it would then have to conduct credit checks and full-scale due diligence on 
2.5 million firms to achieve the same asset growth. Not only is it easier and less costly to lend 
to fifty hedge funds instead. The bonuses for the staff employed are likely to be bigger as 
well. So it is clear where large banks will place their emphasis. As a result, it stands to reason 
that bank scale would tend to be positively correlated with customer size. 
Scale economies for banks, however, become diseconomies for regional and SME 
development: the larger a bank, the less it will be interested in small-scale loans, which are 
demanded more by firms and households in the regions. Thus UK banks favour large loans in 
urban centres. In Germany, by contrast, banking is dominated by almost 2000 small, locally 
headquartered banks distributed all across the country, and whose activity is geographically 
restricted, often by law, to their home ‘turf ’. These small, local banks in the regions (the 
Sparkasse savings banks and Volksbank or Raiffeisenbank cooperative banks) account for 
70% of bank deposits. UK-style high street banks account for only 13% of bank deposits. 
The many local banks are focused on their immediate geographical area and thus tend to 
lend to smaller firms and households. They cannot simply flee their potentially unattractive 
location or try to lend to far-flung large-scale projects. Hence they cannot ‘exploit’ economies 
of scale in the credit business (but they can stay competitive as banks, because they pool 
their back-office operations and gain administrative economies of scale in this way). This 
generates benefits for spatial distribution of economic activity, income, and wealth equality, 
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and, indeed, stability: such small, local banks have not been directly affected by the credit 
crunch. While the large German banks have reduced their lending since 2008—just like the 
banks in Britain—the dominant small, local banks have increased their lending, ensuring 
that SMEs have continued to grow, explaining the resilience of the German economy to the 
financial crisis. The reason for this is that small banks had sounder loan portfolios from local 
lending, and hence did not become risk averse when the financial crisis hit the large banks. 
The latter were nursing significant losses from large-scale speculative financial investments 
that the small banks had not engaged in. Another reason for greater stability of growth and 
employment is the presence of diseconomies of lending scale with respect to employment 
and hence the larger impact on employment per unit of money lent to and invested by SMEs.
How important the geographical restriction of bank activity must be can be seen in the case 
of the deregulation of the Spanish Caja savings banks: while initially similar to the German 
savings banks, once their spatial restriction to the local area was eliminated, their behaviour 
changed for the worse. Asked to compete against each other for market share, they began 
lending in regions far removed from their headquarters, and project sizes trended up. As a 
result, the quality of their lending deteriorated. This behaviour had major implications for the 
nation: it fuelled the speculative credit bubble that has since crashed the Spanish economy 
and caused a sovereign debt-cum-banking crisis. At the same time the German savings banks 
have continued to restrict their lending to their local area. Avoiding the harmful financial 
speculation, these geographically restricted local banks have therefore thrived. So have their 
customers, the SMEs, which matter a lot for the overall economy, since they account for 
between 60% and 70% of employment in most industrialised countries. The sharp dichotomy 
in Spanish and German unemployment rates underlines the huge costs of the neglect of the 
geography of banking.
Local currencies
If we now remember that banks do not lend existing money, but that they are the creators of 
the money supply, through their extension of loans, we obtain the most compelling reason 
yet why a banking system such as Germany’s consisting of many small local banks that are 
geographically restricted in their area of activity must be more attractive. Since banks create 
new money when they extend credit this is tantamount to possessing a geographically well-
distributed system of decentralised central banks, creating and injecting money fairly evenly 
across the geographic areas of Germany, and focusing on small firms. It stands to reason that 
this should deliver a more even spatial distribution of economic activity, and benefits such 
as greater stability, resilience, and equal distribution of wealth. This is indeed what German 
data suggest and why German economic activity is far more evenly distributed across space 
than that in the UK. Indeed, it should be a key reason why SMEs are so successful in Germany 
that they have often become major international exporters: the German countryside is littered 
with small, locally headquartered banks. Towns with little more than 2000 inhabitants 
may boast their own locally headquartered bank, and, supported by it, an SME exporting 
significant volumes of high-value goods.
Conclusion
Banks, through their loan decisions, are a crucial command centre in the economy that affects 
most other aspects of the economy. Thus a fruitful new area of research for geographers 
and social scientists in general should be to examine the role of banking and banking 
system structure in the creation and allocation of credit that is disaggregated by various 
characteristics. This research is likely to help us better understand the causes of banking 
crises and the ingredients for stable, noninflationary, and sustainable growth. It should include 
the geographical aspects of bank credit creation, disaggregated by type (for consumption, 
productive investment, or financial speculation), and its impact on the spatial dis tribution of 
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economic activity and other variables following from it (such as the spatial distribution of 
dwellings, traffic, employment, income and wealth, and human activity in general). For the 
geography of banking is linked to the ingredients of a stable banking system that delivers 
sustainable growth: a decentralised banking structure consisting of many small, independent 
banks that restrict their activity to their immediate geographic location and lend primarily to 
SMEs is likely to prove superior to a centralised banking system dominated by a few large 
banks that have no geographic restrictions on their activities and lend mainly to financial 
speculators. Thus further research on these issues is likely to result in better informed banking 
policy that has a better chance to bring us closer to the promised land of stable, equitable, 
sustainable, and crisis-free economic growth—a goal that has remained elusive following the 
Basel approach to bank regulation that favours large banks and hence furthers concentration 
in banking. The research is also likely to show that, instead of focusing resources on an ever 
smaller number of ever larger banks, it should be cheaper and more effective to capitalise 
new networks of geographically restricted small local banks.
Richard A Werner
University of Southampton Management School, and Centre for Banking, Finance and 
Sustainable Development, University of Southampton; e-mail: werner@soton.ac.uk
References:
Aalbers M, 2009, “Geographies of the financial crisis” Area 41 34–43
Albert M, 1993 Capitalism Against Capitalism (Whurr, London)
Ashcraft A B, 2005, “Are banks really special? New evidence from the FDIC-induced failure of 
healthy banks” American Economic Review 95 1712–1730
Berger A N, Udell G F, 2002, “Small business credit availability and relationship lending: the 
importance of bank organisational structure” Economic Journal 112 F32–F53
Berger A N, Miller N H, Petersen M A, Rajan R G, Stein J C, 2005, “Does function follow 
organizational form? Evidence from the lending practices of large and small banks” Journal of 
Financial Economics 76 237–269
Bernanke S, 1993, “Credit and the macroeconomy” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Quarterly 
Review Spring, 50–70
Boschma A, Frenken K, 2006, “Why is economic geography not an evolutionary science? Towards 
an evolutionary economic geography” Journal of Economic Geography 6 273–302
Cameron A, 2006, “Turning point? The volatile geographies of taxation” Antipode 38 236–258
Cameron A, 2008, “Crisis? What crisis? Displacing the spatial imaginary of the fiscal state” 
Geoforum 39 1145–1154
Cheng C, Werner R, 2013, “An empirical evaluation of central bank research”, CBFSD discussion 
paper, University of Southampton
de Grauwe P, 2010, “The scientific foundation of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) 
models” Public Choice 144 413–443
Diamond D W, 1984, “Financial intermediation as delegated monitoring” Review of Economic 
Studies 51 393–414
Diamond D W, Dybvig P H, 1983, “Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity” Journal of Political 
Economy 91 401–419
Diamond D W, Rajan R G, 2001, “Liquidity risk, liquidity creation and financial fragility: a theory 
of banking” Journal of Political Economy 109 287–327 
Hakenes H, Schmidt R H, Xie R, 2009, “Regional banks and economic development—evidence 
from German savings banks”, discussion paper, House of Finance, Goethe University, Frankfurt
Hall P, Soskice D, 2001 The Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative 
Advantage (Oxford University Press, Oxford)
Hall P, Thelen K, 2009, “Institutional change in varieties of capitalism” Socio-Economic Review 
7 7–34
Hodgson G M, 1996, “Varieties of capitalism and varieties of economic theory” Review of 
International Political Economy 3 380–433
2796 Commentary
Kashyap A K, Rajan R G, Stein J C, 2002, “Banks as liquidity providers: an explanation for the 
coexistence of lending and deposit-taking” Journal of Finance 57 33–73
Knyazeva A, Knyazeva D, 2012, “Does being your bank’s neighbor matter?” Journal of Banking and 
Finance 36 1194–1209
Lyonnet V, Werner R, 2012, “Lessons from the Bank of England on ‘quantitative easing’ and other 
‘unconventional’ monetary policies” International Review of Financial Analysis 25 1–17
Peck J, Zhang J, 2013, “A variety of capitalism … with Chinese characteristics?” Journal of 
Economic Geography 13 357–396
Rajan R G, 1996, “Why banks have a future: toward a new theory of commercial banking” Journal 
of Applied Corporate Finance 9 114–128
Roberts S, 1994, “Fictitious capital, fictitious spaces: the geography of offshore financial flows”, in 
Money, Power and Space Eds S Corbridge, R Martin, N Thrift (Blackwell, Oxford) pp 91–115
Ryan-Collins J, Greenham T, Werner R A, Jackson A, 2012 Where Does Money Come From? (New 
Economics Foundation, London)
Schumpeter J A, 1912 Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung (Duncker und Humblot, Berlin)
Sidaway J, 2008, “Subprime crisis: American crisis or human crisis?” Environment and Planning D: 
Society and Space 26 195–198
Wainwright T, 2011, “Tax doesn’t have to be taxing: London’s ‘onshore’ finance industry and the 
fiscal spaces of a global crisis” Environment and Planning A 43 1287–1304
Wainwright T, Rodgers P, 2013, “Which crisis? The need to understand spaces of (non)tax in the 
economic recovery” Environment and Planning A 45 1008–1012
CBFSD discussion paper, University of Southampton 
Werner R, 1995, “Keiki kaifuku, ryōteki kinyū kanwa kara” [How to create a recovery through 
‘quantitative monetary easing’] The Nihon Keizai Shinbun (Nikkei) ‘Keizai Kyōshitsu’ 
[Economics classroom], 2 September (morning edition), page 26 
Werner R, 1997, “Towards a new monetary paradigm: a quantity theorem of disaggregated credit, 
with evidence from Japan” Kredit und Kapital 30 276–309
Werner R, 2005 New Paradigm in Macroeconomics (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, Hants)
Werner R, 2012, “Towards a new research programme on ‘banking and the economy’—implications 
of the quantity theory of credit for the prevention and resolution of banking and debt crises” 
International Review of Financial Analysis 25 94–105
Werner R, 2013, “Towards a more stable and sustainable financial architecture—a discussion and 
application of the quantity theory of credit” Kredit und Kapital 46 353–389
Woodford M, 2003 Prices and Interest Rates (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ)
Yeung H W-C, 2007, “Remaking economic geography: insights from East Asia” Economic 
Geography 83 339–348
Zarutskie R, 2013, “Competition, financial innovation and commercial bank loan portfolios” Journal 
of Financial Intermediation forthcoming
Zysman J, 1983 Governments, Markets and Growth (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY)
